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NATIONAL SECURITY AND U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY
Edward Alden*
The discussion of immigration and national security is rarely about what
it should be about. What it ought to be about is how the U.S. government
should use the various tools of immigration policy—visas, background
checks, identity verification, border searches, and internal enforcement of
immigration laws—to try to keep out or remove those who might pose a
serious threat to the United States. Instead, since the September 11 terrorist
attacks, national security arguments have been used to justify the expansion
of enforcement measures that are part of a larger effort to identify and
remove illegal immigrants, and have raised the hurdles for entry by all
immigrants. The result has been a set of policy measures that are doing
more to undermine U.S. national security than to enhance it.
Prior to 9/11, immigration was rarely considered as a national security
issue. Most of the debates over immigration in the 1980s and 1990s had
focused either on economic questions, such as the number and mix of legal
immigrants the United States should be accepting, or on law enforcement
questions, such as how best to discourage illegal immigrants from jumping
the queue in search of economic opportunity. But the September 11 attacks
changed the debate in fundamental ways that continue to ripple through
many different facets of immigration law.
As the 9/11 Commission concluded, the failure of the U.S. government
to detect and disrupt the September 11 plot was primarily a failure of
intelligence sharing.1 Immigration and visa policy mistakes also played a
part in allowing the hijackers into the country, but the Commission’s own
judgment on their importance can be inferred from its decision to relegate
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its investigation of that issue to a supplemental staff report.2
Others have found immigration policy more culpable, however. One of
the first U.S. government officials to highlight the role of immigration
policy in relation to the 9/11 attacks was Kris Kobach, a young Kansas law
professor who was awarded a prestigious White House fellowship in 2001
and was detailed to the Justice Department to work on immigration issues.
After September 11, like everyone else at Justice, he was looking for new
ways to prevent another devastating terrorist attack. He seized on the
question of whether a more aggressive campaign of immigration
enforcement might have foiled the plot.
Of the nineteen September 11 hijackers, five of them were in violation
of U.S. immigration law at the time of the attacks—having overstayed or
otherwise violated the terms of the visas that admitted them to the United
States. Four of those five, including three of the pilots, had actually been
stopped by local police at some time in the previous year for traffic
violations. One of the pilots, Ziad Jarrah, was pulled over by a Maryland
police officer two days before the attacks. Jarrah was driving at 95 milesper-hour heading north on Interstate 95 near the Delaware border. But
when the officer ran the usual wants and warrants, nothing showed up. So
he wrote Jarrah a $270 ticket and sent him on his way. At the time,
however, Jarrah had overstayed his tourist visa and, thus, had no right to be
in the United States. But that information was not in the data that was
checked by local police officers. In theory, had such information been
available to local police, three of the four pilots might have been identified
as illegal immigrants, detained, and deported, and the plot would never have
got off the ground.3 As Kobach would later conclude: “The abuse of
immigration laws was instrumental in the deaths of nearly 3,000 people.”4
Tougher enforcement of immigration laws became central to the Bush
administration response after 9/11. Most of the Muslim men who were
rounded up and incarcerated for many months on suspicion of involvement
2
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with the attacks were held in custody on immigration violations.5 Kobach
became the architect of the National Security Entry Exit Registration
System (NSEERS), also known as Special Registration, which increased
scrutiny of foreign male tourists, students, business travelers, and
immigrants coming to the United States from about two dozen “countries of
concern,” most of them Muslim countries.6 The Bush administration ended
a practice known as “catch and release,” in which most illegal immigrants
arrested on immigration charges would be released until their court dates
before an immigration judge. Fearing that a terrorist might be detained and
then released, the U.S. government now incarcerates most of the illegal
immigrants it detains until their court dates. The Bush administration also
aggressively expanded the authority of local police forces under an existing
scheme that had not previously been used, known as 287(g), which allows
the federal government to delegate to state and local police forces expanded
immigration enforcement powers.7 The Justice Department’s Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) went further, concluding that state and local law
enforcement officials have inherent powers to enforce immigration laws,
reversing a Clinton administration OLC opinion from 1996.8 And the
Obama administration has developed its own program, known as Secure
Communities, which involves checking the immigration status of those
arrested for criminal violations.
There were certainly sound national security reasons for improving the
5
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enforcement of immigration laws. The 9/11 attacks had shown that
terrorists were capable of exploiting weaknesses in U.S. immigration and
visa laws to enter the United States and remain here while they plotted the
attacks.9 Many of the initiatives launched over the past decade—including
greater security of passports and other identity documents, biometric
verification of identity, and the collection of advanced information on
incoming passengers—have made it harder for would-be terrorists to enter
the United States. And the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security
have been able to use immigration violations to arrest and deport some
individuals suspected of having ties with terrorist groups.
But the national security argument has also been exploited effectively
by those whose primary agenda is not advancing national security, but
rather restricting immigration. Consider the publications of the Center for
Immigration Studies (CIS), a research group that advocates lower levels of
immigration. Their website lists about 170 publications from 1986 through
September 2001, not a single one of which focused on immigration policy
and national security. The pre-9/11 papers concerned matters such as the
impact of immigration on labor markets, social welfare costs, cultural
identity, rule of law and other issues that have long been a staple of the
immigration debate in this country. But since 9/11, roughly half of the CIS
publications have been about various aspects of how U.S. immigration
policies threaten national security.10 This shift in the discussion of
immigration can be interpreted in different ways. It is true that September
11 was a wake-up call for many that weak or poorly enforced immigration
laws could pose a security risk. But it is also clearly true that, after 9/11,
the terrorist threat became a particularly compelling argument in favor of
something that CIS and other groups had long advocated—namely lower
immigration levels and a crackdown on illegal immigration.
Kris Kobach’s subsequent career underscores the links between the
national security argument and a traditional restrictionist agenda. After
leaving the government in 2003, Kobach was hired to mount a legal defense
for the town of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, whose mayor Lou Barletta was
championing an ordinance that would penalize local businesses and
landlords for employing or renting to illegal immigrants.11 Kobach became
9
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the primary legal architect of SB 1070, the controversial Arizona law that
would increase the powers of state and local police to question individuals
on their immigration status. That law has been temporarily stayed as a
result of a legal challenge by the Obama administration. Kobach has also
defended Sheriff Joe Arpaio, the Arizona lawman who has been
investigated by the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights
Division amid accusations of discrimination and unconstitutional searches
and seizures in connection with immigration enforcement. Kobach has
argued that Arpaio can ignore Washington, because he and all local sheriffs
have inherent authority to stop and question people on their immigration
status, and to carry out immigration arrests.12
Whatever the motivations of the various players, there are two things
that are clear about the relationship between national security and
immigration law in the post 9/11 era. First, the United States in the past
decade has greatly expanded its immigration enforcement efforts, largely in
response to the terrorist attack. Secondly, the overwhelming majority of
those affected by this stepped-up immigration enforcement do not pose any
sort of national security threat, terrorist or otherwise.
What if we try to stand back, then, and simply ask the question: “What
role can immigration policies play in preventing another terrorist attack in
the United States?” The answer is a very limited role. There are two main
reasons for this.
The first is what can be called the “targeting problem.” We know
enough about al-Qaeda and its operations to recognize that the United States
is not facing a mass terrorist army, but rather a fairly small number of
trained operatives with the capacity to inflict enormous damage. CIA
director Leon Panetta has said that maybe 50 to 100 al-Qaeda fighters
remain in Afghanistan, while National Counterterrorism Center Director
Michael Leiter has estimated that there are probably another 300 in
neighboring Pakistan.13 Even accounting for the various other sympathetic
which ruled that the ordinance interfered with federal primacy in immigration law. See
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010). Former Hazleton mayor Lou
Barletta was elected to Congress in November, 2010 as a Republican candidate running on
the Tea Party platform.
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groups around the world, identifying terrorists is a needle in a haystack
problem of figuring out who the bad guys are when they are swimming in a
huge sea of ordinary people. On any given day, about 1.1 million peoples
enter the United States, of whom some 700,000 are foreign nationals. Some
of those will turn out not to have the proper documents or otherwise be
ineligible to enter the United States, and Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) officers will turn them around at the port-of-entry. The Border
Patrol is still apprehending about 2,000 people each day trying to cross the
southern border illegally, which is less than half of the peak levels of a
decade ago and the lowest since the early 1970s. But that is still a lot of
people.
For effective counterterrorism, however, you need good intelligence that
helps to identify the genuine threats among this huge number of border
crossers. Take the case of Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the so-called
Christmas bomber who narrowly failed to ignite explosives he had
concealed in his underwear before boarding a trans-Atlantic airliner bound
for Detroit. He was legally entitled to get on a plane to the United States,
since he possessed a valid U.S.-government issued tourist visa. “Enforcing
immigration laws” would have done nothing to keep him off the plane. The
failure was rather a targeting failure—the U.S. government as a whole knew
enough about Abdulmutallab that his visa should have been revoked and his
name placed on the “no-fly” list to keep him off the flight. Instead, the
State Department failed to act on what it knew, and while CBP officials
identified him as a target of concern (thanks to the advanced passenger
information that airlines must now provide), their plan was to question him
after he arrived in Detroit. The almost successful Christmas attack was a
failure of timely intelligence analysis and synthesis, not a failure of
immigration enforcement.14
A similar pattern can be seen in the use of immigration enforcement
laws domestically. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the DHS
branch responsible for interior immigration enforcement, periodically issues
public updates on its use of immigration laws in terrorism-related cases.
The most recent update, in November 2008, details more than a dozen cases
http://health.newamerica.net/publications/resources/2010/the_evolving_nature_of_terroris
m_nine_years_after_the_911_attacks_0.
14
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in which individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism were order
deported. But in not a single one of those cases were the individuals
identified as a result of immigration violations. Instead, they were all
targeted as a result of successful criminal or intelligence investigations, and
immigration law was simply the means for removing them from the
country.15
The most effective use of immigration powers is in support of
intelligence gathering efforts. Any measure that can help to target particular
suspect individuals has a national security value. These include the
gathering detailed information on airline passengers, taking fingerprints
from visa applicants and arriving travelers, and running background checks
on a very limited number of individuals who may raise red flags. There are
civil liberty and privacy concerns that must be weighed in such efforts, but
their contribution to security is demonstrable. In contrast, broader measures
such as the detention of all immigration violators, or the scrutiny of huge
groups of individuals under programs like NSEERS have made little
demonstrable contribution to security. The most that could be said by the
9/11 Commission investigators was that better routine enforcement of
immigration laws may “raise obstacles for and in some cases have a
deterrent effect on individuals intending to commit terrorist attacks.”16
The second reason that immigration policy has limited utility as a
national security tool is what can be called the “adaptability problem.” If
the United States relies on immigration-related controls to keep out or
remove terrorists, the terrorists will adapt, by making sure their operatives
comply with the relevant immigration laws and by finding recruits who are
already inside the United States. That appears to be exactly what has
happened in the decade since 9/11. The Center for Immigration Studies in
2002 did a study looking at some 48 individuals who were charged or
convicted or admitted involvement in terrorist plots inside the United States
between 1993 and 2001, including the 9/11 attacks. The study found that
one-third of those 48 were in the U.S. on legal temporary visas, another
third were lawful permanent residents or naturalized U.S. citizens. Onequarter of them, however, were illegal immigrants, mostly visa overstayers.
15
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So there was a plausible argument that, prior to 9/11, tougher immigration
enforcement could have disrupted some of these terrorist plots.17
But the picture has changed markedly in the past decade. According to
a list compiled by the Heritage Foundation, between October 2001 and
October 2010, there have been nearly 30 foiled terrorist plots inside the
United States, directly involving 63 individuals who were in the United
States at the time of their arrest.18 From independent research, we found
that of those 61 individuals, 31 were U.S.-born citizens, 14 were naturalized
citizens, one was a dual citizen, nine were legal immigrants or visa-holders
and only seven were illegal immigrants. One individual’s status could not
be determined. So, for the sake of argument, if the United States had in
place a perfect immigration enforcement system, it might have
preemptively arrested six of the plotters, or just over 10 percent of the total.
A similar conclusion was reached in the detailed 2010 investigation of the
terrorist threat to the United States led by terrorism experts Peter Bergen
and Bruce Hoffman. Using a broader measure of terrorism-related
incidents, they found that 43 U.S. citizens had been involved in terrorist
activities in 2009 alone. They concluded that the key shift in recent years
“is the increasingly prominent role in planning and operations that U.S.
citizens and residents have played in the leadership of Al-Qaeda and aligned
groups, and the higher number of Americans attaching themselves to these
groups.”19
It’s almost certainly true that the number of illegal immigrants involved
17
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in such plots has shrunk because immigration enforcement has made it
harder to enter to the United States illegally, or to remain here. But terrorist
groups have just worked around the problem, in particular by recruiting
U.S. citizens. Similarly, Bergen and Hoffman found that terrorist groups
had bypassed ethnic and racial profiling programs like NSEERS by
recruiting jihadists “who do not fit any particular ethnic, economic,
educational or social profile.” Given the adaptive capability of terrorist
groups, enforcement of immigration laws is at best going to have a small
role to play in preventing future terror attacks inside the U.S.
To be clear, the limited utility of immigration enforcement in national
security is not an argument per se against immigration enforcement. There
are a host of very good and legitimate reasons for the United States to do a
better job enforcing its immigration laws. But preventing terrorist attacks is
not one of those reasons.
The problem is that, by enforcing immigration laws as if U.S. national
security were at stake, the U.S. government has inadvertently served to
weaken some of the foundations that underpin U.S. national security. The
United States became the world’s greatest military power because it
developed and harnessed the most advanced technologies and techniques
for warfare. Its future security depends on maintaining that leadership.
Gordon England, the former deputy defense secretary in the Bush
Administration, told investigators for the National Research Council in
2007 that: “The greatest long-term threat to U.S. national security is not
terrorists wielding a nuclear or biological weapon, but the erosion of
America’s place as a world leader in science and technology.” After 9/11,
that obvious conclusion was forgotten.
Immigrants have long been a critical part of the U.S. scientific and
technological enterprise. Foreign students and immigrants make up more
than half of the scientific researchers in the United States. Immigrants file
25 per cent of the patent applications, roughly twice their representation in
the population. In 2009, the Nobel Prizes in the sciences went to nine
people—three Americans, two Canadians, and one each from Australia,
Hong Kong, India and Israel. All of them were educated at American
universities, and eight made their careers in the United States. If these
people stop coming here and doing cutting edge scientific research, the
costs to America’s national security will be incalculable. There is a
straight-line connection between the U.S. ability to attract talented
immigrants, and its economic and military prowess. As Yale’s Amy Chua
has argued in her history of the great powers: “To pull away from its rivals
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on a global scale, a society must pull into itself and motivate the world’s
best and brightest, regardless of ethnicity, religion or background.”20 No
country has done that better than the United States.
But in the name of national security, U.S. immigration policy since 9/11
has instead been driving many of those people away.21 New York Mayor
Michael Bloomberg has called recent U.S. immigration policy a road to
“national suicide.” The problems include visa delays, restrictive quotas for
skilled workers, and limited opportunities for gaining permanent residence,
especially for nationals of big countries like China and India. Foreign
students had come to the United States in steadily increasingly numbers for
virtually all of the post-World War II period. After 9/11, however, foreign
student enrollment declined for several years and has only recently
recovered to pre-9/11 levels. More worrisome, foreign graduate student
numbers fell sharply and have still not fully recovered. All this occurred in
a decade in which the international student population soared. The UK
nearly doubled its inflows of foreign students, as did Australia, France and
New Zealand saw similar gains. Overall, the U.S. share of the world’s
foreign students fell from 28 per cent in 2000 to 21 percent by 2008. If the
pre-9/11 trends had instead continued, foreign student enrollment would
have been 25 per cent higher than it is today.22
The United States has also damaged its moral leadership. This has long
been a country of immigrants, and, with some sad and notable historical
exceptions, the U.S. government has generally treated immigrants with
respect, fairness and dignity. Unfortunately, in the aftermath of 9/11, the
past decade has been one of those periods that will not stand up well when
the history books are written.
To take just one of many possible examples, one of the policies adopted
by the Department of Homeland Security after September 11 was to end
what was known as “catch and release.” Catch and release was shorthand
for a practice in which, if an illegal immigrant were apprehended in the
20
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United States, in most cases he or she would be released and told to appear
on a certain date before an immigration judge, who would determine
whether that individual would be deported. Not surprisingly, many of those
apprehended did not show up for their court dates. One such individual,
Ghazi Ibrahim Abu Maizar, came across illegally from Canada and was
arrested and released, and turned out to be a Palestinian terrorist who in
1997 tried to set off a bomb in the Brooklyn subway. After September 11,
DHS took on the sizeable project of ending “catch and release” by building
enough jail cells to incarcerate all those apprehended while they waited for
their court dates.
As a result, on any given day there are about 32,000 of these people in
jails, up from about 7,000 per day in the mid-90s.23 Only they are not
terrorists; they are people who came to the United States illegally to work,
or came here legally and fell out of status for one reason or another by, for
example, overstaying a tourist visa or violating the terms of a student visa.
The conditions of these jails are pretty horrific, although improvements are
now being made. Studies by the Migration Policy Institute, Human Rights
Watch and other groups have documented woeful medical treatment,
individuals moved across the continent from their families without familynotification, as well as families jailed with children.24 Incarceration is
expensive as well; it costs about $100 a day to keep immigration violators
in prison, compared with alternatives to detention that cost a fraction of that
amount. DHS has itself acknowledged these problems, and a priority of the
Obama administration has been to try to fix the mess. But it was a mess
created by the idea that tough immigration enforcement was necessary to
protect the United States from terrorist attacks.
The U.S. government has built many of the elements of a border and
immigration control system that allow for intelligent judgments about who
might pose a threat to the United States and should therefore not be
admitted to the country. There has been genuine progress in patching the
many holes of the pre-9/11 regime. But the laudable effort has been
perverted by those who misuse the national security argument as a pretext
for immigration restrictions. The result has been significant damage, and if
23
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it is not addressed lasting damage, to some of the foundations of U.S.
economic strength and its national security.

